June 5 marks four years since Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Egypt imposed a five-month ban on Qatar since the Council of Cooperation in Al-Ula in Saudi Arabia, which saw the potential for widespread spread. the history of the organization. How the 43-month blockade began and how it ended shows a dramatic change in regional and foreign attitudes since 2017.
Therefore, it is important to review what we have learned over the past four years, whether the agreement signed in Al-Ula is stable, and how the reconciliation process is progressing.
From beginning to end, Qatar’s closure was a study of US President Donald Trump’s state of affairs and a weakening of international law. Qatar’s political and economic independence began with the abduction of the Qatar News Agency and the sowing of rumors about Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani. This led to a series of events followed by a demonstration of a difficult period set in the concept of “other facts” – a statement made by Trump’s top adviser, Kellyanne Conway, in January 2017.
The closure also followed a speech by Trump’s forthcoming Emirati administration and Saudi officials who began a visit by Abu Dhabi’s Chief of Staff Mohammed bin Zayed to New York to meet members of the revolutionary movement in December 2016. Trump is making his first visit. international visit to Riyadh in May 2017. This period included a number of events that appear to be aimed at making decisions to the White House in the design and development of a campaign to persuade Qatar to be the best player at regional events.
The move proved to be a boon when Trump shocked observers, including all accountants, his government secretaries and security officials, by backing a cover-up and appearing to support the decision against Qatar in talks held in Riyadh two weeks earlier. Trump’s remarks threatened to raise the bar on the security and safety alliance in Qatar and the US and reaffirmed the hope of closing the heads of state that Trump’s alliance would enable him to take part in the debate.
We see, too, the idea that the entire US government would follow the White House in its participation was wrong, and it was back to Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Secretary of Defense James Mattis, and U.S. military leaders who eventually led Trump to change his stance.
It is unclear why the closed government officials, along with some former US political analysts, would have considered this. Another possibility is that the Trump administration, who entered office and announced loudly that they wanted to do things their own way despite obstacles and customs, simply encouraged friends and foes alike to believe what it meant.
By September 2017, the blockade was centered on a system that remained in favor of Trump’s tough leadership. A visit to the White House the same month by Emir Sabah al-Ahmad Al Sabah in Kuwait was marked by Emir Sabah’s comment that “the important thing is that we have stopped the war”, but Kuwaiti and the US trying to mediate found it difficult to deal with the conflict. At least two times, in December 2019 and July 2020, hopes for reconciliation between Saudi-Qatari were shattered, highlighting the difficulty of resolving a dispute that affected five groups and not just two.
What led to Al-Ula launch in January 2021 was a series of events, regionally and globally, in 2019 and 2020. While, in Qatar, it was Trump’s tweets in support of the blockade in June 2017 that (temporarily) cast doubt on the reliability of the alliance. of the US, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi “their moment of truth” came between May and September 2019. The failure of Trump officials to respond to a series of attacks on maritime and power struggles in Saudi Arabia and surrounding areas and the UAE reached its climax in finalizing divisions between them. on US and Saudi demands publicly after the Saudi military intervention took place.
The 2019 invasion, which is linked to Iran, has established a balance between Saudi and Emirati ideology and the idea, especially when it comes to Iran, that their interests and US interests are the same. Emirati and Saudi leaders began reaching out to Iran, directly or indirectly, to seek solutions to the conflict, as the Qatari leadership responded to the September 2019 attacks on Abqaiq by affirming the GCC’s security policy. If nothing else, the 2019 terrorists showed that, in all its diverse ways, Doha was not the first, or most dangerous, threat to the security and stability it created in 2017.
The following year, Trump’s failure to reverse the results of the 2020 presidential election meant that Gulf leaders expected Biden to take over the post in January 2021. During the campaign, Biden and others in his party questioned the region, especially Saudi Arabia’s credibility. and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman as his ally. Therefore, it came as no surprise that the transition from Trump to Biden also saw the end of a blockade that would never happen again under any other president, with Saudi officials placing Mohammed bin Salman at the head of the conciliation summit, depicting him as regional commissioner and drawing a line. over the last four years.
Although the exact nature of the Al-Ula agreement has not been disclosed, there are reasons to confirm that the reconciliation process is more lasting than the Riyadh treaty signed which ended the 2014 conflict, and failed to prevent the eruption in 2017. In particular, subsequent meetings were held between Qatar and Emirati and Qatari and Egyptians as well as a number of talks have taken place to address the crisis.
This shows that the Al-Ula Treaty, unlike the Riyadh Treaty, is not a one-size-fits-all solution but a one-way groundbreaking two-way solution that could lead the parties to greater depth than a single “generic” size-fit-all. ” It also shows acceptance that problems are possible and have not been established as a “take-away-or-leave” as the 13 demands made by countries that closed in June 2017 were not the trigger for negotiations.
It also appears that the recognition of the volatility in which Qatar’s relations with the four non-aligned countries will not be able to move at the same speed or depth. So far there are indications that relations have changed rapidly and farther away from Saudi Arabia and (slightly) Egypt, indicating that the initial blockade of hostilities did not originate in Riyadh or Cairo. Along with other GCC leaders, the Qatari leadership showed support for the prince in February after the release of the CIA results in the 2018 assassination of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi and reaffirmed the importance of Saudi Arabia’s stability to regional security in Gombe. Emir Tamim went to Mohammed bin Salman’s in Jeddah on May 10 and relations in all parties appear to have been restored.
The closure of Qatar was the longest in the history of the GCC, which became its 40th anniversary on May 25, and, unlike previous seasons, the consequences were not only for leaders and policymakers but also for all nations. Damage to the “Gulf house” can take a long time to repair and remember the anger and frustration in the media and the media can exist. In the meantime and for the foreseeable future, all those in the area can set up modus vivendi until the regional or other countries change again.