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In June 2015, militant groups in Mali signed a peace treaty that could bring peace to the troubled country.
However, in May, the country met its own challenges second coup in nine months. A few weeks earlier, a former rebel leader who was a member of a peace movement had been was killed. Violent groups, including those linked to al-Qaeda and ISIL (ISIS), often pose threats in the north, central, and east of Mali, and their presence spreads south and across the border. Meanwhile, France has announced confusion of Operation Barkhane, its counter-terrorism operation in Mali and the Sahel.
As the United Nations Security Council prepares to vote later this month on whether to increase its role in the UN peacekeeping mission there, it is time to reconsider its commitment to international peace.
Mali needs more help from around the world to address the obstacles to peace, and it is urgently needed.
To figure out what to do next you need to start by reviewing the 2015 peace agreement – and it has not yet been implemented. Signed after the civil war in 2012, the coalition was supposed to rebuild a coalition of political forces that would establish political power and hold elections, and establish a safe haven for Mali. But the task of translating the agreement into action is tantamount to, in the midst of the political turmoil in Bamako, hopes for fulfillment are diminishing.
As the Independent Observer accredited for the implementation of the peace agreement, The Carter Center first recognized why the agreement was difficult to achieve and what could be achieved, which we have described in detail reports.
Although the 2015 agreement is not perfect, it does have the necessary requirements to address the grievances that have led to several civil wars in Mali since independence. Instead, the signatories – both before and after the government, as well as the Platform and Coordination of Azawad Movements (or CMA) – support. International organizations, which have persevered in the agreement and are committed to achieving the goal, now need to look for immediate solutions to the gridlock and maintain an important pillar of peace in Mali and prevent the spread of violence in the region.
First, a coalition of countries that has violated the treaty should initiate a pilot, pilot project, assisted by major international consultants, to work with the government, the CMA, and the Platform to formulate a joint military plan.
The failure of the military to protect northern Mali and its apparent unwillingness to merge the CMA with its former freedom fighters, according to a peace deal, has established security in the north.
After leaving the army, the armies joined a new, more allied alliance. The Coalition emphasizes that it responds to the real problems of the country – the need to protect people from violent and criminal gangs and to create a better environment for them. He is also an opponent of the Malian security forces and is sometimes seen as uncooperative in combating his fighters with their weapons into military forces. Alliance members also have a history of associating with violent groups.
The inclusion of the armed forces in the armed forces is essential for lasting stability, while the establishment of a united force could strengthen Mali’s ability to deal with the threats of terrorist and criminal forces. After six intermediate years, it is time for all parties to agree on the design and structure of a cohesive team and begin to establish them.
Second, Mali’s neighbors, who are most vulnerable to the violence in the country, need to play a key role in leading efforts to address other barriers to achieving the agreement and address the shared challenges.
Following the coup in August 2020 and the subsequent seizure, a African Union and Economic Group in West Africa States he replied boldly, insisting on his return to military service. The encouragement and coercion of Mali’s neighbors is essential to enable the signatories to pass through the division of power, justice, and economic development of the treaty, many of which are vital to the military and have not been fully addressed by the national governments.
Finally, Mali’s allies should urge the signatories to articulate the benefits of the agreement and to understand the views of its citizens. Many Malian people do not believe in, understand, or oppose the peace deal because they have not seen the results because political leaders have not made the right choice. Efforts to spread the message have begun, but more is needed, including town halls, auditoriums, and radio campaigns, which can be supported by outsiders. With the availability of information, public fears should be reduced, and improve responsiveness.
Significant changes are needed to keep the peace process in Mali in place. Mali’s international allies have long considered themselves to be peacemakers, believing that the government will play a key role in solving the country’s problems. The commission recently called off the proposal and reaffirms that the Malian parties need to be reformed, to help other countries live up to their promise of unity and to address the root causes of the crisis in 2012.
Encouragedly, active action by international partners can provide assistance to the Malian parties to move forward. To do so soon, the 2015 agreement will continue to fade and the prospect of lasting peace in Mali – and the region – remains unfulfilled.
The views expressed in this article are for the authors only and do not necessarily reflect the views of the editor of Al Jazeera.
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