Ships Navigate In Conflict In Unity Areas

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Bergman had already detected false positives on the AIS page, while yachts from online racing games had appeared on AISHub last year. But this was the first time they had seen real ships take over, as well as warships in the same way.
“At SkyTruth, we are particularly concerned about a scandal involving fishing,” Bergman said in a telephone interview. “But we want to understand how the allegations were made and what we can do to see and correct them.”
Bergman identified nine warships from the photographs in the article, and then compared their false AIS messages with actual messages published by the same ships before and after. He realized right away that these were not athletes or accidents. “The false information was very clear, except that we had this confirmation from the Swedish military that the officers were false,” he said.
There are more than 20 types of AIS information – some for sailors, some for fun boaters – and each has a number of information sections that cover everything from where you are going to the communication route. By closely comparing areas that are rarely visible to sailors, Bergman has finally found a distinction between falsehood and reality. He then used the process to write a question for the World AIS database – and was amazed at the results.
The search found about a hundred text messages from several AIS data providers, returning until late September and traveling thousands of miles. Worst of all, the ships affected were the only warships from Europe and NATO, plus two US submarines.
“It was shocking when I realized that there are so many other ships that are also showing the strange history of AIS,” says Bergman. But they should have known that the suspicious messages of the AIS were false, not because of the complexities of the war or the special military environment. Bergman spent the next few months working hard to secure the exact location of the ships he wanted. Initially, they use open source information including reports, military publications, and favorite pages like Warshipcam.com. “Most people like to take pictures of ships and put them online,” says Bergman. “I’ve found examples of trains leaving or entering a place that seems impossible.”
Bergman then covered the radar with photos taken by the European Space Agency’s Sentinel-1 and –2 Satellites on AIS suspicion tests. If they were real, the AIS would have to match exactly under the pictures of the ship.
Instead, Bergman only sees an empty sea, from time to time. Instead, he says, “I still haven’t found a time when a song that has been proven to be false has become true.”
The stars were not always consistent with the work of Bergman’s researchers. Some AIS tracks did not align with the satellite above ESA, or crashed on cloudy days when visual images were useless. And some warships didn’t have many Instagram fans. In the end, Bergman was able to confirm at least 15 percent of AIS data as false.
Also Queen ElizabethH flotilla, Bergman found fake missions from the US, Dutch, Belgian, Germany, Lithuanian, Estonia, and other Swedish warships. One suspicious method, which has not been mentioned before, depicts a USSS weapon destroyer Roosevelt Warming 4 km in Russian waters around Kaliningrad last November, travel that would have been as useless as real. It appears that there were five other fraudulent trips near Kaliningrad in June. One affected Polish warships following exactly the same speed, speed, and route similar to the Swedish corvette five days earlier, another indication in Bergman that the movement was made up of numbers.
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