On November 30, the Iraqi Electoral Commission announced the results of the October 10 by-elections. Meanwhile, their enemy Shia al-Fatah alliance – which is affiliated with the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMFs) – lost votes and decided to reject the results.
These tensions between Shia political leaders have opened the door to a new political system in which the leading Kurdish parties in Iraq can play a major role. Sadr has previously stated that he will not interact with other factions within al-Fatah and the State of Law party of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and will instead seek “more government” through alliances with Sunni and Kurdish. political power.
If Sadr’s efforts are successful in establishing a stable government, it could strengthen the Kurds’ hand in Iraqi politics and help end the long-running feud between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Autonomous Region of Iraq (KRI). Such positive results, would depend on the ability of Kurdish major parties to unite in negotiations, which could mean overcoming their internal divisions and conflicts.
Intra-Kurdish problems
Since the early 1990s, the Kurdish region of Iraq has been ruled by a power-sharing coalition between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), both of which command the Peshmerga army to remain loyal to them. However, in recent years, the PUK has been losing access to the KDP and the newly formed parties, which has disrupted the process. Instead, the October election severely disrupted KDP power in favor of KDP.
Of the 63 seats that Kurdish parties have won in the new parliament, 31 have KDP and only 18 are PUK. In a major development, the KDP managed to win two seats at each heart of the PUK – Kirkuk and Sulaimaniyah.
The results will have a profound effect on the relationship between the two parties, especially in terms of those seeking the presidency of Iraq and the leadership of Kirkuk.
Since the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003 following the US invasion, the Iraqi presidency has been handed over to a Kurdish delegation through a power-sharing deal with Sunnis and Shia. Then another simultaneous arrangement between the KDP and the PUK granted the right to choose the next candidate in exchange for the KRI leadership to the KDP figure.
A similar alliance between the two parties was established in connection with the Kirkuk leadership, which was held by the Kurdish until 2017. Although Kirkuk is part of the “conflict zones”, which have a large Kurdish population but are not part of the KRI, they do. traditionally he seems to belong to the PUK, because most of its leaders are from the region.
But the KDP no longer sees any reason to comply with previous arrangements, especially since it feels that the powerful PUK leaders handed him over after the 2017 Kurdish independence referendum, when the PUK Peshmerga withdrew from Kirkuk, like the Shia militias sent by Baghdad. “punishing” the Kurdish leadership for the future. The Iraqi government elected the Arabs as the new ambassador.
The KDP now wants to speak out in the election of the new president and ambassador of Kirkuk. At present the PUK still believes that it has the military power to resist any attack on its interests.
In February 2019, the KDP and the PUK agreed to elect a Kurdish governor, but it has not yet happened for two reasons. For the first time a dispute between PUK leader Lahur Talabani’s party and Masoud Barzani, KDP leader, has prevented the two parties from bringing in a representative. Second, the continued presence of Shia-backed militias in the region and Baghdad’s unwillingness to accept the election of a new governor are major challenges.
However, recent changes in the PUK could increase the chances of a connection between the two Kurdish parties. The KDP leadership and the current leadership of the PUK are allied against Lahur Talabani, who was ousted from his post as another PUK president in July this year.
In early November, the PUK Political Bureau confirmed its expulsion from the party, paving the way for another PUK president, Bafel Talabani, to formally abolish the coalition leadership system and take over the party. This could open the door to a full-fledged KDP alliance with Kirkuk, the Iraqi leadership and other challenges.
Opportunity for the Kurds
In the October 10 election, Kurdish parties increased their seats in the Iraqi parliament from 58 to 63. Sunni groups have about 70 seats, but unlike Kurdish parties, they have less power and do not run directly. regions of the Sunni. For this reason, the Kurds have a great opportunity to play the role of emperor.
In Sadr’s “multi-national system”, Kurdish parties would have the opportunity not only to increase the number of positions, but also to shift from participating in the Iraqi prime minister to a genuine elections.
Aside from the growing number of government debates, the progress of the Kurdish party elections could also help them in a number of thorough negotiations with Baghdad.
First, there is the question of budget allocation and fuel distribution. In 2014, amid disputes between KRI President Masoud Barzani and former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Baghdad decided to stop allocating part of the Kurdish state budget, criticizing Erbil for not providing the agreed oil to the State Organization for Marketing. of Oil.
Since then, a number of treaties have been signed, but no one has been able to resolve the dispute. In June this year, Baghdad and Erbil reunited, bringing the former 200 billion dollars ($ 137m) a month to the Kurdistan Government (KRG). However, the agreement is acceptable in this year’s budget, so Kurdish parties will have the opportunity to negotiate within the government negotiations.
Second, there is the question of “conflict zones”, which include the province of Kirkuk and twelve provinces in the regions of Nineveh, Diyala and Salahaddin. The situation in the region is due to be resolved by KRI and Baghdad after Iraqi law was enacted in 2005, but this did not happen. During the fight against ISIS, the Peshmerga KRI forces were able to control some of these areas, but after a referendum, they were forced to leave.
Since then, there have been limited administrative, security and political alliances between Baghdad and Erbil in these areas, with pro-Iranian forces controlling security.
In the October elections, Kurdish parties did well in these areas, with all five new seats won in the disputed territories of Nineveh, Salahaddin, and Diyala.
Kurdish parties now have six seats out of 12 in Kirkuk, and 11 out of 31 seats in Nineveh. The rise of Kurdish politics in these areas may contribute to discussions of their role. What KRG can expect to gain is Baghdad’s approval for the appointment of a Kurdish governor of Kirkuk and security officials in the disputed territories.
The increasing ISIS activities in these regions make the alliance even more important, but this should include eliminating some form of conflict with the Iranian military used in the region. This would be difficult to achieve, unless Sadr changed his mind of separating al-Fateh from other Shia sects.
Regardless, a “mass regime” could be a great opportunity for KRI leadership to reap huge benefits. But if they do not agree to meet the demands of the Kurdish people, then their failure may come back to haunt them.
Like many other political parties, the leading Kurdish parties have also observed a decline in aid. As the KDP increased its presence in parliament with eight seats, the number of votes it received dropped by more than 100,000 votes in the KRI constituency compared to the 2018 election. and four. This, together with the protests that have taken place at KRI over the past four years, reflects the growing dissatisfaction among the Iraqi Kurdish people and their leaders.
If Kurdish ritual leadership is failing to get the maximum benefit from its people from the best available location right now, another notorious violent explosion must occur soon.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Al Jazeera.
