As a matter of fact, things were very different. Western armies had the opportunity to use a variety of technologies around the world, from space observations to remote systems such as robots and drones. But for them, the war in Afghanistan was not a war of attrition; it was a war of choice. And because of this, a lot of expertise was its purpose is to reduce the risk of injuries rather than success. The Western military has invested heavily in weapons of mass destruction – air fresheners, drones – or technology that could speed up emergency medical treatment. Factors that make the enemy taller or protect the military from casualties, such as gunfire, weapons, and the detonation of a roadside bomb, are what have been the focus of the west.
The West’s most important military presence has been elsewhere: the war between the superpowers. Technically, this means investing symbolic arrows to align with Chinese or Russian, for example, or military geniuses to try to capture them.
Technology is not a driving force, nor is it a guarantee of success. Instead, it is useful.
The Afghan government, which was seized between the two countries, became more closely allied with the Taliban than an alliance. This was not a war of choice but a serious threat. Yet the government has not been able to progress as much as the Taliban; Its growth has been hampered by the fact that foreign troops are supplying large sophisticated weapons. When the Afghan army and police actually handed over the bodies of the war veterans (and many lives lost during this time), they were unable to make or use their own machines. The West did not want to equip Afghan people with cutting-edge weapons, fearing that they would not be held hostage or that they would fall into the hands of the Taliban.
Take the Afghan army. He was given, and trained, less than a dozen planes. This contributed to a closer supply of air, but it was not really difficult. And working with the US means that Afghanistan was not free to look elsewhere for transfer of expertise; Instead, it was just a little bit bigger.
What does this tell us? It says that professionalism is not the driving force behind conflict, nor is it the guarantee of success. Instead, it is useful. And even old-fashioned weapons can carry the day in the hands of well-meaning, patient people who are ready — and able — to go anywhere they want.
It also tells us that tomorrow’s battlefield may look like Afghanistan: we will see less technical conflicts that the military wins, and old and new skills go hand in hand. It is already evident in conflicts such as the one between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the way we have done it is what we can see over time. Technology may no longer win the war, but new ones can – especially if one side is struggling with an existing problem.
Christopher Ankersen and associate professor of international medicine at New York University. He served at the United Nations in Europe and Asia from 2005 to 2017 and with the Canadian Army from 1988 to 2000. The author and editor of several books, including Military Politics and Tthe future of Global Affairs, holds a PhD from the London School of Economics and Political Science.
Mike Martin and a spokesman for Pushtu, a former British military officer who has traveled to Afghanistan several times as a police officer, instructing British troops on how to go to war. He is now a fellow war veteran at King’s College London and a writer The Cold War, which has been waging war in southern Afghanistan since 1978. He holds a PhD from King’s College London.
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